INCENTIVES FOR THE COORDINATION OF DECENTRALIZED TRANSIT CHOICES

IN A WELL-FUNCTIONING COMPETITIVE MARKET SYSTEM, DECENTRALIZED CHOICES BY INDIVIDUALS CAN SERVE THEIR INTERESTS WELL; BUT IN A TYPICAL CONTEMPORARY SETTING, SUCH CHOICES, AT LEAST ABOUT TRANSIT, DO NOT. FLAWS IN THE ALLOCATIVE CONSEQUENCE OF DECENTRALIZED TRANSIT CHOICES ARE ILLUSTRATED HERE BY REFERENCE TO AN IDEAL SET OF PRICE SIGNALS AND DESCRIPTION OF SOME OF THE WAYS IN WHICH REAL-WORLD PRICES DIFFER FROM THE IDEAL ONES. ONE CONSEQUENCE OF THIS DISTORTION BETWEEN REAL AND IDEAL PRICE SIGNALS IS THAT BUS COMPANIES MAY NOT BE ABLE TO SURVIVE A PROFIT TEST IN CITIES EVEN THOUGH BUS SERVICE ACTUALLY MAY BE DESIRED AND COULD SURVIVE UNDER IDEAL PRICES. TAX AND SUBSIDY INCENTIVES THAT CAN APPROXIMATE THE IDEAL PRICE SIGNALS ARE DESCRIBED, AND INCENTIVES FOR EFFICIENT OPERATION OF BUS SERVICES ALSO ARE BRIEFLY NOTED. /AUTHOR/

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    • Sponsored by Committee on Transportation Systems Planning and Administration. Distribution, posting, or copying of this PDF is strictly prohibited without written permission of the Transportation Research Board of the National Academy of Sciences. Unless otherwise indicated, all materials in this PDF are copyrighted by the National Academy of Sciences. Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved
  • Authors:
    • Sherman, Roger
  • Conference:
  • Publication Date: 1973

Media Info

  • Media Type: Print
  • Features: References;
  • Pagination: pp 8-20
  • Monograph Title: Price-subsidy issues in urban transportation
  • Serial:

Subject/Index Terms

Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 00202466
  • Record Type: Publication
  • ISBN: 0309022614
  • Files: TRIS, TRB
  • Created Date: Jul 22 1982 12:00AM