Strategic Interactions between Transport Operators with Several Goals

In this paper, the authors examine competition between transportation operators having goals that extend beyond traditional profit maximization. In particular, the authors note that operators maximize a weighted combination of profits and consumer surplus. The authors calculate equilibrium solutions for the case of symmetric firms producing symmetrically differentiated services. Equilibrium prices, consumer surplus, and total surplus arising from collusion, Cournot and Bertrand competition are compared. The results are discussed, considering the operators' pay-off functions, their costs, and the degree of substitutability or complementarity between the services.

  • Availability:
  • Authors:
    • Clark, Derek J
    • Jorgensen, Finn
    • Pedersen, Pal A
  • Publication Date: 2009-9


  • English

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Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 01142719
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Source Agency: UC Berkeley Transportation Library
  • Files: BTRIS, TRIS
  • Created Date: Oct 21 2009 8:03PM