Towards a Risk-Based Aviation Security Policy

This paper describes how the well-coordinated terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 presented the world with a new aviation security threat: the capture of aircraft in flight to be used as human-guided missiles. The two previous threats—hijacking an aircraft for ransom and putting a bomb aboard an aircraft—had led to varying degrees of screening of baggage and passengers in developed countries, plus some use of on-board security personnel on selected flights in some countries. In the wake of 9/11, governments in the United States, Canada, and Europe (at both national and EU levels) implemented a number of additional aviation security measures, among them: (1) strengthened (and locked) cockpit doors; (2) 100% screening of checked baggage; (3) more thorough screening of passengers and their carry-on baggage; (4) increased use of on-board security officers; (5) increased attention to air cargo; and (6) greater attention to airport access control and perimeter control. This paper is organized as follows. First, to provide context, it discusses macro-level considerations in countering terrorism. Next, it provides a provocative example of applying risk analysis to assess the cost-effectiveness of several post-9/11 aviation security measures. With that as background, the paper then compares and contrasts the post-9/11 aviation security policies of the USA, Canada, and the EU countries, with costs and risks as a principal focus. Finally, it provides suggestions for making aviation security policy more consistently risk-based.


  • English

Media Info

  • Media Type: Print
  • Features: References;
  • Pagination: pp 83-110
  • Monograph Title: Terrorism and International Transport : Towards Risk-based Security Policy

Subject/Index Terms

Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 01140512
  • Record Type: Publication
  • ISBN: 9789282102312
  • Files: TRIS
  • Created Date: Sep 21 2009 1:30PM