Security After Insecurity: Toward a Rational Response to 9/11

In this article (Paragraph No. 5151), the author urges that the U.S. must implement a comprehensive system of registered users that employs elements of passenger profiling based on a perceived level of threat to ensure that the events of September 11, 2001 are not repeated. According to the author, it is simply irresponsible and dangerous for the government to ignore the national origin characteristics of the terrorists implicated in the attacks of September 11th. Similarly, the present system of searching all of the people all of the time in the same manner with frequent "random" checks wastes valuable resources by focusing its efforts on individuals that clearly are not threats. From a human factors standpoint, the current system lessens the alert status of security personnel to those with a higher potential threat. Labeling individuals as potential threats merely because of their ethnicity or country of origin seems wrong given the fundamental tenet in our society that discriminating against another is wrong both morally and legally. The distinction here is that "passenger profiling" is not "racial profiling" or discriminating. Instead, it merely involves assessing the clear and present threat that terrorism poses and focusing the nation's resources on eliminating the threat with the least amount of intrusion to those impacted. This may involve limited privacy intrusions and even more vigorous searches if initial evidence suggests a potential threat exists. On the other hand, the author urges that the scope of the searches be limited and a "trusted traveler" system be set up in an entirely voluntary manner. At the same time, the Federal Government must not delve into our personal lives and violate the Constitutional protections of the Fourth Amendment. Data protection is the key and the Federal Government must ensure that it does not release sensitive or confidential information about an individual without clear standards. Since September 11th, it is clear that the existing system, from INS to Customs, from intelligence to law enforcement and, yes, airport security, was too lax. We became too complacent. The perceived domestic risk level was far too low. The answer, the author urges, entails a significant overhaul of the current computer-assisted passenger pre-screening system (CAPPS) and implementation of a state-of-the-art trusted traveler program or "registered user" system. Focus on clearing the "good guys" and spare time to focus intensively on the bad guys -- the system needs to not just be bigger, but smarter, more efficient, and more effective, the author concludes.

• Corporate Authors:

  International Aviation Law Institute

  DePaul University College of Law, 25 E Jackson Boulevard
  Chicago, IL  United States  60604
• Authors:
  • Quinn, Kenneth P
• Publication Date: 2004

Language

• English

Media Info

• Media Type: Print
• Edition: Transfer Binder 1: 2001 to 2004
• Pagination: pp 1201-1222
• Monograph Title: Issues in Aviation Law and Policy

Subject/Index Terms

• TRT Terms: Aviation; Civil rights; Passenger screening; Privacy; Protection; Risk assessment; Security; Terrorism
• Identifier Terms: Terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001
• Uncontrolled Terms: Trusted traveler
• Subject Areas: Aviation; Law;

Filing Info

• Accession Number: 01149583
• Record Type: Publication
• Files: TRIS
• Created Date: Jan 29 2010 12:03PM