INCENTIVE MECHANISMS FOR PRIORITY QUEUING PROBLEMS

Development of an incentive mechanism to induce users of a service facility to reveal the parameters the system administrator requires to determine the optimal sequence of service to queued users. First considered is using the taxation procedure recently suggested for public goods, and then develop a more efficient mechanism based on marginal delay costs. It is found that setting the priority price for service equal to the marginal delay cost imposed on others structures a situation such that a user maximizes his individual welfare by revealing his true delay cost. This work is pertinent to airports as well as maintenance shops and supply depots.

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  • Corporate Authors:

    American Telephone and Telegraph Company

    195 Broadway
    New York, NY  USA  10007
  • Authors:
    • Dolan, R J
  • Publication Date: 1978

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Subject/Index Terms

Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 00195055
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Source Agency: Engineering Index
  • Files: TRIS
  • Created Date: Jul 31 1979 12:00AM