The Political Calculus of Congestion Pricing
The political feasibility of using prices to mitigate congestion depends on who receives the toll revenue. This chapter will argue that congestion pricing on freeways will have the greatest chance of political success if the revenue is distributed to cities, and particularly to cities through which the freeways pass. In contrast to a number of previous proposals, we argue that cities are stronger claimants for the revenue than either individual drivers or regional authorities. We draw on theory from behavioral economics and political science to explain our proposal, and illustrate it with data from several metropolitan areas. In Los Angeles, where potential congestion toll revenues are estimated to be almost $5 billion a year, distributing toll revenues to cities with freeways could be politically effective and highly progressive.
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Corporate Authors:
William Pratt House, 9 Dewey Court
Northampton, MA United States 01060-3815 -
Authors:
- King, David
- Manville, Michael
- Shoup, Donald
- Publication Date: 2008-6
Language
- English
Media Info
- Media Type: Print
- Features: References; Tables;
- Pagination: pp 357-382
- Monograph Title: Road Congestion Pricing in Europe. Implications for the United States
Subject/Index Terms
- TRT Terms: Congestion management systems; Congestion pricing; Economic factors; Political factors; Revenues; Road pricing; Toll collection; Toll roads; Traffic congestion; Transportation planning
- Geographic Terms: Los Angeles (California)
- Subject Areas: Economics; Finance; Highways; Planning and Forecasting; I10: Economics and Administration; I72: Traffic and Transport Planning;
Filing Info
- Accession Number: 01109841
- Record Type: Publication
- ISBN: 9781847203809
- Files: TRIS
- Created Date: Aug 27 2008 2:09PM