Different Policy Objectives of the Road-Pricing Problem: A Game-Theoretic Approach

The authors of this chapter argue that the reactions of transit operators on congestion charging should be considered, as these charges will influence traveler costs, which in turn affect the optimal congestion charge. The authors analyze the impact of profit-maximizing transit fare setting on the social surplus under a range of congestion charges. The authors also examine the competitive advantages of tolling for transit operators.


  • English

Media Info

  • Media Type: Print
  • Features: Figures; References; Tables;
  • Pagination: pp 151-169
  • Monograph Title: Pricing in Road Transport. A Multi-Disciplinary Perspective

Subject/Index Terms

Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 01109779
  • Record Type: Publication
  • ISBN: 9781845428600
  • Files: TRIS
  • Created Date: Aug 21 2008 2:03PM