Different Policy Objectives of the Road-Pricing Problem: A Game-Theoretic Approach

The authors of this chapter argue that the reactions of transit operators on congestion charging should be considered, as these charges will influence traveler costs, which in turn affect the optimal congestion charge. The authors analyze the impact of profit-maximizing transit fare setting on the social surplus under a range of congestion charges. The authors also examine the competitive advantages of tolling for transit operators.

• Availability:
  • Find a library where document is available. Order URL: http://www.e-elgar-environment.com/Bookentry_Main.lasso?id=4192
• Corporate Authors:

  Edward Elgar Publishers

  William Pratt House, 9 Dewey Court
  Northampton, MA  United States  01060-3815
• Authors:
  • Joksimovie, Dusica
  • Bliemer, Michiel C J
  • Bovy, Piet H L
• Publication Date: 2008-4

Language

• English

Media Info

• Media Type: Print
• Features: Figures; References; Tables;
• Pagination: pp 151-169
• Monograph Title: Pricing in Road Transport. A Multi-Disciplinary Perspective

Subject/Index Terms

• TRT Terms: Congestion pricing; Game theory; Peak fares; Policy making; Road pricing; Strategic planning; Transit operators; Travel costs
• Subject Areas: Economics; Finance; Highways; Policy; Public Transportation; Society; I10: Economics and Administration;

Filing Info

• Accession Number: 01109779
• Record Type: Publication
• ISBN: 9781845428600
• Files: TRIS
• Created Date: Aug 26 2008 7:16AM