Paying for performance: uncertainty, asymmetric information and the payment model

Privatisation has led to a growing interest in more complex contractual forms designed to give public transportation operators the incentives for effort that maximise value for money. Contract theory provides a rich research basis for selecting an appropriate contractual form, with an emphasis on the effects of uncertainty and asymmetric information. To date, however, there have been few applications of contract theory in the field of transportation. This paper identifies the key empirical results from the multi-disciplinary literature to help transportation researchers and practitioners place contractual decision-making in the broader theoretical context, suggesting aspects of transportation contracting that merit future research. (a) For the covering entry of this conference, please see ITRD abstract no. E215911.

  • Authors:
    • HOOPER, L
  • Publication Date: 2007-8

Language

  • English

Media Info

Subject/Index Terms

Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 01094854
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Source Agency: ARRB
  • Files: ITRD, ATRI
  • Created Date: Apr 25 2008 8:04AM