Bounding the Inefficiency of Toll Competition among Congested Roads

This paper examined the inefficiency of toll competition with general inverse demand functions. The authors probe into more details of the inverse demand function and established more precise bounds under specific situations. This paper is intended to investigate the inefficiency of the equilibria for a situation where two or more profit-maximizing private firms operate multiple toll roads in a parallel road network. The inefficiency of ologopolistic toll competition is examined in the absence of any regulatory authority. To derive the inefficiency bound, the author technically avoid the interplay of link travel time functions by using the market share (percentage of total traffic flow) of each road, which is an equilibrium outcome that arises from given toll charges and link travel time functions. The final bounds turn out to be mainly dependent upon the property of the demand function. Furthermore, for the symmetric case where all roads have identical travel time functions, the provide author provide analytical expression of the bounds in terms of the number of the parallel roads only.


  • English

Media Info

  • Media Type: Print
  • Features: Appendices; Figures; References; Tables;
  • Pagination: pp 27-54
  • Monograph Title: Transportation and Traffic Theory 2007

Subject/Index Terms

Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 01076713
  • Record Type: Publication
  • ISBN: 9780080453750
  • Files: TRIS
  • Created Date: Sep 4 2007 12:47PM