Dynamic Stackelberg equilibrium congestion pricing

This paper considers the problem of dynamic congestion pricing that determines optimal time-varying tolls for a pre-specified subset of arcs with bottleneck on a congested general traffic network. A two-person nonzero-sum dynamic Stackelberg game model is formulated with the assumption that the underlying information structure is open loop. Characteristics of the Stackelberg equilibrium solution are analyzed. The Hooke-Jeeves algorithm that obviates an evaluation of the gradient vector of the objective function is presented with a numerical example. The paper concludes with its future extensions.

• Record URL:
  http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VGJ-4NNPCCJ-1/2/68f0537bc4fde841f300cde8a738f017
• Availability:
  • Find a library where document is available. Order URL: http://worldcat.org/issn/0968090X
• Supplemental Notes:
  • Abstract reprinted with permission from Elsevier
• Authors:
  • Wie, Byung-Wook
• Publication Date: 2007-6

Language

• English

Media Info

• Media Type: Print
• Features: Figures; References; Tables;
• Pagination: pp 154-174
• Serial:
  • Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies
  • Volume: 15
  • Issue Number: 3
  • Publisher: Elsevier
  • ISSN: 0968-090X
  • Serial URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/0968090X

Subject/Index Terms

• TRT Terms: Algorithms; Bottlenecks; Congestion pricing; Equilibrium (Systems); Game theory; Networks; Tolls; Traffic congestion
• Uncontrolled Terms: Dynamic network equilibrium
• Subject Areas: Economics; Highways; Society; I10: Economics and Administration;

Filing Info

• Accession Number: 01054080
• Record Type: Publication
• Files: TRIS
• Created Date: Jul 17 2007 9:11AM