Dynamic Stackelberg equilibrium congestion pricing
This paper considers the problem of dynamic congestion pricing that determines optimal time-varying tolls for a pre-specified subset of arcs with bottleneck on a congested general traffic network. A two-person nonzero-sum dynamic Stackelberg game model is formulated with the assumption that the underlying information structure is open loop. Characteristics of the Stackelberg equilibrium solution are analyzed. The Hooke-Jeeves algorithm that obviates an evaluation of the gradient vector of the objective function is presented with a numerical example. The paper concludes with its future extensions.
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Availability:
- Find a library where document is available. Order URL: http://worldcat.org/issn/0968090X
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Supplemental Notes:
- Abstract reprinted with permission from Elsevier
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Authors:
- Wie, Byung-Wook
- Publication Date: 2007-6
Language
- English
Media Info
- Media Type: Print
- Features: Figures; References; Tables;
- Pagination: pp 154-174
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Serial:
- Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies
- Volume: 15
- Issue Number: 3
- Publisher: Elsevier
- ISSN: 0968-090X
- Serial URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/0968090X
Subject/Index Terms
- TRT Terms: Algorithms; Bottlenecks; Congestion pricing; Equilibrium (Systems); Game theory; Networks; Tolls; Traffic congestion
- Uncontrolled Terms: Dynamic network equilibrium
- Subject Areas: Economics; Highways; Society; I10: Economics and Administration;
Filing Info
- Accession Number: 01054080
- Record Type: Publication
- Files: TRIS
- Created Date: Jul 17 2007 9:11AM