The Political Calculus of Congestion Pricing

The political feasibility of using prices to mitigate congestion depends on who receives the toll revenue. We argue that congestion pricing on freeways will have the greatest chance of political success if the revenue is distributed to cities, and particularly to cities through which the freeways pass. In contrast to a number of previous proposals, we argue that cities are stronger claimants for the revenue than either individual drivers or regional authorities. We draw on theory from behavioral economics and political science to explain our proposal, and illustrate it with data from several metropolitan areas. In Los Angeles, where potential congestion toll revenues are estimated to be almost $5 billion a year, distributing toll revenues to cities with freeways could be politically effective and highly progressive.

• Record URL:
  http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VGG-4MSHT6R-2/2/ab0039e3d1918f9e8cd69c474723a527
• Availability:
  • Find a library where document is available. Order URL: http://worldcat.org/oclc/29485010
• Supplemental Notes:
  • Abstract reprinted with permission from Elsevier
• Authors:
  • King, David
  • Manville, Michael
  • Shoup, Donald
• Publication Date: 2007-3

Language

• English

Media Info

• Media Type: Print
• Features: References; Tables;
• Pagination: pp. 111-123
• Serial:
  • Transport Policy
  • Volume: 14
  • Issue Number: 2
  • Publisher: Elsevier
  • ISSN: 0967-070X
  • Serial URL: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/issn/096707X

Subject/Index Terms

• TRT Terms: Cities; Congestion pricing; Economics; Freeways; Policy analysis; Political factors; Political science; Revenues; Tolls
• Geographic Terms: Los Angeles (California)
• Subject Areas: Economics; Finance; Highways; Planning and Forecasting; Policy; I10: Economics and Administration; I72: Traffic and Transport Planning;

Filing Info

• Accession Number: 01046572
• Record Type: Publication
• Files: TRIS, ATRI
• Created Date: Apr 25 2007 1:45PM