Impact of Landing Fees on Airlines’ Choice of Aircraft Size and Service Frequency in Duopoly Markets

A one-shot simultaneous game-theoretic model is applied in a duopoly market to investigate how airport landing fees could influence airlines’ decisions on aircraft size and service frequency. It is found that higher landing fees will force airlines to use larger aircraft and less frequency, with higher load factor for the same number of passengers. It is also found that airlines will be better off if some of the extra landing fees are returned to airlines as a bonus for airlines using larger aircraft, which consequently reduces airport congestion.

• Record URL:
  http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VGP-4KW5W96-1/1/3990f26cacef0eb38f3b7e23da114060
• Availability:
  • Find a library where document is available. Order URL: http://worldcat.org/oclc/31005945
• Supplemental Notes:
  • Abstract reprinted with permission from Elsevier.
• Authors:
  • Wei, Wenbin
• Publication Date: 2006-11

Language

• English

Media Info

• Media Type: Print
• Features: References; Tables;
• Pagination: pp 288-292
• Serial:
  • Journal of Air Transport Management
  • Volume: 12
  • Issue Number: 6
  • Publisher: Elsevier
  • ISSN: 0969-6997
  • Serial URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/09696997

Subject/Index Terms

• TRT Terms: Aircraft; Airlines; Airports; Decision making; Landing fees; Passengers
• Candidate Terms: Airport congestion
• Uncontrolled Terms: Aircraft size; Duopoly; Service frequency
• Subject Areas: Aviation; Finance; Passenger Transportation; Terminals and Facilities; Vehicles and Equipment;

Filing Info

• Accession Number: 01042820
• Record Type: Publication
• Files: TRIS
• Created Date: Mar 1 2007 11:00AM