REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF A NUCLEAR CASK DURING A HYPOTHETICAL RAILROAD ACCIDENT

The study results indicate that blindly selecting the ''worst-possible-case assumptions'', and then postulating a radioactive material (RAM) release without identifiable mechanisms compounds unrealism and adds confusion. In order for a RAM release to occur, an unlikely series of events must first occur which breach the multiple containment barriers surrounding the fuel. The overall safety margin provided by the packaging equipment increases geometrically beyond the already adequate margin provided by each containment barrier. A case evaluation of the NL 10/24 packaging system illustrates this contention by showing that: (1) the accident events which must occur before a release of RAM, other than gases, is possible are in themselves incredible; and (2) the biological effects of a release of fission gases will in all liklihood be nil. (ERA citation 03:043414)

  • Supplemental Notes:
    • Symposium on packaging and transportation of radioactive materials, Las Vegas, NV, USA, 7 May 1978.
  • Corporate Authors:

    Allied-General Nuclear Services

    Barnwell, SC  USA 

    Department of Energy

    1000 Independence Avenue, SW
    Washington, DC  USA  20585
  • Authors:
    • Anderson, R T
  • Publication Date: 1978-5

Media Info

  • Pagination: 22 p.

Subject/Index Terms

Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 00185619
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Source Agency: National Technical Information Service
  • Report/Paper Numbers: CONF-780506-25
  • Contract Numbers: ET-78-C-09-1040
  • Files: TRIS
  • Created Date: Dec 29 1979 12:00AM