No-Fault for Motor Vehicles: An Economic Analysis

This article compares incentives and efficiency under the tort system to the various no-fault regimes used in U.S. states and other jurisdictions. The authors also study these regimes to understand why jurisdictions have tended to adopt more and more complicated systems of liability. Under no-fault systems, drivers are allowed to opt out of no-fault and file lawsuits if their damages exceed a certain threshold. The authors find that no single liability always dominates on efficiency grounds, but the pure tort system does best when costs of care are low, and pure no-fault does best when costs of care are high. Choice systems, in which drivers choose between no-fault or pure tort systems, lead to less efficient results because drivers choose the pure tort rule too often.

• Availability:
  • Find a library where document is available. Order URL: http://worldcat.org/issn/14657252
• Authors:
  • Liao, Yu-Ping
  • White, Michelle J
• Publication Date: 2002

Language

• English

Media Info

• Media Type: Print
• Features: Appendices; Figures; References; Tables;
• Pagination: pp 258-294
• Serial:
  • American Law and Economics Review
  • Volume: 4
  • Issue Number: 2
  • Publisher: Oxford University Press
  • ISSN: 1465-7252

Subject/Index Terms

• TRT Terms: Automobile insurance; Costs; Crashes; Health care; Laws and legislation; No fault insurance; Tort liability
• Subject Areas: Economics; Finance; Highways; Law; Planning and Forecasting; Society; I10: Economics and Administration; I72: Traffic and Transport Planning;

Filing Info

• Accession Number: 01013493
• Record Type: Publication
• Files: TRIS
• Created Date: Dec 12 2005 6:19AM