Weapon Effectiveness Models: Are They Appropriate for Use in Force Protection Analyses?

The Department of Defense has developed numerous weapon effectivness tools that have been successfully used in evaluating the performance of military warheads against enemy above-ground and underground targets. Tools such as the Air Force Research Laboratory’s (AFRL’s) Modular Effectiveness/Vulnerability Assessment (MEVA) code and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s (DTRA’s) Integrated Modular Effectiveness Analysis (IMEA) code embody algorithms for blast and fragment environment characterization, structural response analyses, and equipment and structural fault tree assessments. Additional analysis tools like the Extended Collateral Damage (ECD) Methodology, developed to support a number of applications, also include algorithms for predicting personal injury and death. Because physical security assessments share the need for modeling blast and fragmentation effects on structures and personnel, once approach to cost-effectively advancing physical security code capabilities is to apply existing weapon effectiveness codes to defensive purposes. This paper examines the technical issues associated with attempting this type of technology transition, and makes recommendations for addressing the technical issues that arise from the differences between weapon effectiveness and physical security applications.


  • English

Media Info

  • Media Type: Print
  • Features: Figures; References; Tables;
  • Pagination: pp 23-32
  • Monograph Title: Safety and Security Engineering

Subject/Index Terms

Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 01007170
  • Record Type: Publication
  • ISBN: 1845640195
  • Files: TRIS
  • Created Date: Nov 3 2005 12:12PM