The North American transportation grid enables national and international commerce and supports literally all other critical infrastructures within the United States. However, increasing reliance on computer technology for improved communication and automation of traffic and transportation control networks has created vulnerabilities within those control systems that are similar to those seen in electric power control systems. Particularly vulnerable are (1) control center and dispatch communications, (2) computer controlled equipment for access, safety and monitoring, and (3) remotely accessible real-time actuators regulating transportation flow (e.g., bridges, tunnels, rail crossings, arterial routes, etc.). Especially vulnerable are IP-addressable and modem-accessible in-the-field devices used to monitor and regulate traffic flows in large urban environments. Cyber attacks and electronic sabotage targeted against these vulnerabilities have the capability of inducing transportation disruptions over very large geographic areas. Loss of life, property, production, and service may result from those outages. With the financial support of the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the Department of Transportation's Research and Special Programs Administration, a two year study was undertaken of similar vulnerabilities with the electric power infrastructure. The analyses of cascading failures within the electric power grid demonstrate that catastrophic failure is fraught with common mode faults. Post-mortem analyses show that these vulnerabilities can be identified and modeled using methods called Common Mode Failure Analysis (CMFA) and Survivability Systems Analysis (S/SSA). When used together CMFA and S/SSA provide effective tools to identify network vulnerabilities, and point the way toward mitigation strategies and design parameters that can be used to construct more robust and survivable control networks. In this project the CMFA and S/SSA processes were adapted to make them applicable to transportation control networks. This work is exemplified with a security and survivability analysis of the proposed City of Moscow Intelligent Transportation System.


  • English

Media Info

  • Features: Appendices; Figures; Tables;
  • Pagination: 31 p.

Subject/Index Terms

Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 00989187
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Report/Paper Numbers: N05-01,, Final Report
  • Contract Numbers: DTRS98-G-0027
  • Files: TRIS, USDOT
  • Created Date: Apr 11 2005 12:00AM