THE GENERALIZED NASH EQUILIBRIUM MODEL FOR OLIGOPOLISTIC TRANSIT MARKET WITH ELASTIC DEMAND

In this article, a transit network is described by a set N of transfer stations (nodes) and a set S of route sections (links). The transit route is also referred to as a path. The authors present a bilevel transit fare equilibrium model for a deregulated transit system. The authors demonstrate that there is a generalized Nash game between transit operators, which is formulated as a quasi-variational inequality problem. The bilevel transit fare equilibrium problem is presented in the Stackelberg form and solved by a heuristic solution algorithm based on a sensitivity analysis approach. In the Stackelberg form, the transit operators dominate the decision-making process and the passengers' response is represented explicitly. The authors include a numerical example to show the competition mechanism on the transit network. The authors conclude that, according to their numerical analysis, the transit operators can achieve competitive advantages by improving their service quality, which is beneficial to passengers.

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    Elsevier

    The Boulevard, Langford Lane
    Kidlington, Oxford  United Kingdom  OX5 1GB
  • Authors:
    • Zhou, J
    • Lam, WHK
    • Heydecker, B G
  • Publication Date: 2005-7

Language

  • English

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  • Accession Number: 00988897
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Files: TRIS, ATRI
  • Created Date: Apr 4 2005 12:00AM