DELAYER PAYS PRINCIPLE: EXAMINING CONGESTION PRICING WITH COMPENSATION

A goal of congestion pricing is to adjust the personal cost of a trip in congested conditions such that equilibrium occurs at the lower volume where the marginal cost curve intersects the demand curve. This article investigates the issue of compensation and several possible alternatives. The authors first outline the equity and efficiency concerns of conventional (uncompensated) congestion pricing. Next, they suggest a new compensation mechanism, which they call "delayer pays" principle. This mechanism explicitly quantifies the full marginal cost of travel delay. Drivers will pay the price that corresponds to the full marginal cost (delay caused to others), but they will also collect the corresponding compensation for the delay they experience, which would not exist but for the presence of others. The final section of the article considers a further exploration of delayer pays pricing in which the authors evaluate the effectiveness of this idea by simulating many different tolling approaches and evaluating the results across several measures. The authors discuss issues of modeling, equilibrium, and policy, including solutions to varied policy objectives and the practical implementation of congestion pricing. The authors conclude that this method is viable and could eliminate some common hurdles of congestion pricing while remaining revenue neutral.

  • Availability:
  • Corporate Authors:

    Instituti Editoriali e Poligrafici Internazionali

    Via Giosue Carducci 60, Ghezzano
    La Fontina,   Italy  56010
  • Authors:
    • Levinson, D
    • Rafferty, P
  • Publication Date: 2004-10

Language

  • English

Media Info

Subject/Index Terms

Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 00986570
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Files: TRIS, ATRI
  • Created Date: Feb 28 2005 12:00AM