Airline regulation is assumed to fix fares and the number of competitors. Noncooperative schedule determination in a single regulated market served by a small number of carriers is analyzed. Comparative static effects of changes in cost and demand conditions, regulated fares, and numbers of carriers on rates of return, load factors, flight frequency, and excess profits are considered. The signs of important effects are either definite or depend simply on one or two observable magnitudes. Interpretations of the results are presented, and some implications for regulatory policy and future research are discussed. /Author/

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  • Corporate Authors:

    American Telephone and Telegraph Company

    195 Broadway
    New York, NY  United States  10007
  • Authors:
    • Schmalensee, R
  • Publication Date: 1977

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Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 00173851
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Files: TRIS
  • Created Date: Jun 28 1978 12:00AM