The system safety principles and procedures developed by the U.S. Department of Defense are discussed with regard to their applicability to transit. Possible difficulties include the cost of implementing large-scale system analysis techniques, such as fault-free analysis, and the difficulty of obtaining reliable probability data for the various failure modes when completely new and unproven designs are considered. Notwithstanding these difficulties, there does not seem to be any inherent conflict between Department of Defense procedures and traditional railroad practices. In fact, the former specifically recommend that historical safety data from similar applications be integrated into the safety plan and that fail-safe design procedures be used to control high-risk situations. Two examples of how military risk management techniques can be combined with traditional rail practices are provided. The first is a preliminary hazard analysis, and the second shows how fault-tree techniques can be used to investigate whether a brick-wall stopping criterion is really necessary. /Author/

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    • This paper appears in Dual Mode Transportation, which is a publication containing the proceedings of a conference conducted by the Transportation Research Board, May 29-31, 1974. Distribution, posting, or copying of this PDF is strictly prohibited without written permission of the Transportation Research Board of the National Academy of Sciences. Unless otherwise indicated, all materials in this PDF are copyrighted by the National Academy of Sciences. Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved
  • Corporate Authors:

    Transportation Research Board (TRB)

    Washington, DC   
  • Authors:
    • McGean, Thomas J
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  • Publication Date: 1976

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  • Accession Number: 00149279
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Files: TRIS, TRB, ATRI
  • Created Date: Mar 30 1977 12:00AM