Traffic assignment over a network can be carried out for the condition that all drivers will choose their routes so that no driver acting individually can reduce his travel cost by switching over to an alternative route. An equilibrium point is defined as a set of total flows satisfying this criterion. This is a game-theoretic problem and it will be assumed that all the players have completed information about the roadway and traffic conditions at any instant. It is assumed that the travel cost on a link is a function of the total traffic flow on the link. This paper investigates the properties of the equilibrium situation for various types of cost functions with capacity restrictions. /TRRL/

  • Supplemental Notes:
    • Transportation and Traffic Theory. Proceedings of the Sixth International Symposium on Transportation and Traffic Theory. University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia, August 26-28, 1974.
  • Corporate Authors:


    Radarweg 29
    Amsterdam,   Netherlands  1043 NX
  • Authors:
    • Buckley, D
  • Publication Date: 1974

Media Info

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Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 00152912
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Source Agency: Transport and Road Research Laboratory (TRRL)
  • Report/Paper Numbers: Proceeding
  • Files: ITRD, TRIS
  • Created Date: Jun 17 1977 12:00AM