To improve labour productivity and reduce ticket issuing costs many European transport operators have introduced various honour fare collection systems which incorporate spot-check or random ticket inspection. The increased opportunity for fare evasion in such honour systems forces consideration of the appropriate level of ticket inspection. In this paper we discuss a general model of non-compliance. The model draws on established mathematical literature on tax evasion, but is strongly motivated by behavioural considerations. Account is taken of both perceived and actual probabilities of detection as influenced by the level of expenditure on inspection. This paper considers alternative policy objectives and some means by which they can be achieved. (Author/TRRL)

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  • Corporate Authors:

    Bath University, England

    Claverton Down
    Bath BA2 7AY,   England 
  • Authors:
    • Boyd, C
    • MARTINI, C
    • RICKARD, J
    • RUSSELL, A
  • Publication Date: 1989-5

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Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 00491734
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Source Agency: Transport Research Laboratory
  • Files: ITRD, TRIS
  • Created Date: Mar 31 1990 12:00AM