FARE EVASION AND NON-COMPLIANCE: A SIMPLE MODEL

To improve labour productivity and reduce ticket issuing costs many European transport operators have introduced various honour fare collection systems which incorporate spot-check or random ticket inspection. The increased opportunity for fare evasion in such honour systems forces consideration of the appropriate level of ticket inspection. In this paper we discuss a general model of non-compliance. The model draws on established mathematical literature on tax evasion, but is strongly motivated by behavioural considerations. Account is taken of both perceived and actual probabilities of detection as influenced by the level of expenditure on inspection. This paper considers alternative policy objectives and some means by which they can be achieved. (Author/TRRL)

• Availability:
  • Find a library where document is available. Order URL: http://worldcat.org/oclc/856156
• Corporate Authors:

  Bath University, England

  Claverton Down
  Bath BA2 7AY,   England 
• Authors:
  • Boyd, C
  • MARTINI, C
  • RICKARD, J
  • RUSSELL, A
• Publication Date: 1989-5

Media Info

• Features: References;
• Pagination: p. 189-197
• Serial:
  • Journal of Transport Economics and Policy
  • Volume: 23
  • Issue Number: 2
  • Publisher: University of Bath
  • ISSN: 0022-5258
  • Serial URL: http://www.jtep.com

Subject/Index Terms

• TRT Terms: Crimes; Crimes involving transportation; Detection and identification; Detectors; Fare collection; Mathematical models; Policy; Public transit; Surveillance
• Candidate Terms: Fare evasion
• ITRD Terms: 9115: Detection; 6473: Mathematical model; 1516: Offence; 173: Policy; 744: Public transport; 9101: Surveillance; 241: Tariff
• Subject Areas: Highways; Planning and Forecasting; Policy; Public Transportation; Security and Emergencies;

Filing Info

• Accession Number: 00491734
• Record Type: Publication
• Source Agency: Transport Research Laboratory
• Files: ITRD, TRIS
• Created Date: Mar 31 1990 12:00AM