FAIL-SAFE AND COINCIDENCE CIRCUITRY ON REACTOR SAFETY SYSTEM

Proposed revisions for the safety system on the N.S. Savannah include fail-safe circuitry to ensure scram action whenever scram conditions exist, and coincident circuitry to require two of three signals prior to scram to prevent spurious outages. Fail-safe circuitry will initiate a scram signal in the event a circuit or channel cannot carry one. Applied to two out of three coincident circuitry, a scram must be initiated on an auctioneered basis involving the remaining two channels after failure of any one channel. Existing nuclear scram circuits are not considered adequately fail-safe for operation of the N.S. Savannah.

• Supplemental Notes:
  • This document is available for review at the Department of Commerce Library, Main Commerce Building, Washington, D.C., under reference number ESI-27 A&B-1.
• Corporate Authors:

  Ebasco Services Incorporated

  Two Rector Street
  New York, NY  United States 

  States Marine Lines, Incorporated

  ,    
• Publication Date: 1961-4-13

Media Info

• Pagination: 19 p.

Subject/Index Terms

• TRT Terms: Control systems; Instrumentation; Nuclear powered ships; Nuclear reactors; Safety
• Old TRIS Terms: Nuclear reactor control systems; Nuclear reactor instrumentation; Nuclear reactor safety
• Subject Areas: Marine Transportation; Safety and Human Factors; Vehicles and Equipment;

Filing Info

• Accession Number: 00026238
• Record Type: Publication
• Source Agency: Maritime Administration
• Report/Paper Numbers: ESI-27 A&B-1 Intrm Rpt
• Contract Numbers: MA-1889
• Files: TRIS, USDOT
• Created Date: Feb 6 1974 12:00AM