FAIL-SAFE AND COINCIDENCE CIRCUITRY ON REACTOR SAFETY SYSTEM
Proposed revisions for the safety system on the N.S. Savannah include fail-safe circuitry to ensure scram action whenever scram conditions exist, and coincident circuitry to require two of three signals prior to scram to prevent spurious outages. Fail-safe circuitry will initiate a scram signal in the event a circuit or channel cannot carry one. Applied to two out of three coincident circuitry, a scram must be initiated on an auctioneered basis involving the remaining two channels after failure of any one channel. Existing nuclear scram circuits are not considered adequately fail-safe for operation of the N.S. Savannah.
- This document is available for review at the Department of Commerce Library, Main Commerce Building, Washington, D.C., under reference number ESI-27 A&B-1.
Ebasco Services IncorporatedTwo Rector Street
New York, NY United States
States Marine Lines, Incorporated,
- Publication Date: 1961-4-13
- Pagination: 19 p.
- TRT Terms: Control systems; Instrumentation; Nuclear powered ships; Nuclear reactors; Safety
- Old TRIS Terms: Nuclear reactor control systems; Nuclear reactor instrumentation; Nuclear reactor safety
- Subject Areas: Marine Transportation; Safety and Human Factors; Vehicles and Equipment;
- Accession Number: 00026238
- Record Type: Publication
- Source Agency: Maritime Administration
- Report/Paper Numbers: ESI-27 A&B-1 Intrm Rpt
- Contract Numbers: MA-1889
- Files: TRIS, USDOT
- Created Date: Feb 6 1974 12:00AM