Indivisibilities give rise to scale economies in the provision of many local public services. Exploitation of these scale economies often requires that the activities of several communities be coordinated. In this study the game analogue to a simple solid waste collection system is analyzed in order to determine the requirements for the design of a financing system that will sustain optimal participation in a regional service system. The researchers found that market based pricing in the face of scale economies created by indivisibilities will generally not support an optimal partition of communities into service districts. They also found that characterization of the game structure of local public service delivery systems is feasible and provides information for designing appropriate cost-sharing arrangements.

  • Corporate Authors:

    Pittsburgh University, Pittsburgh

    Pittsburgh, PA  United States  15213

    National Science Foundation

    Division of Advanced Environmental Research and Technology
    Washington, DC  United States  20550
  • Authors:
    • Ochs, J
  • Publication Date: 1974-11-30

Media Info

  • Pagination: 53 p.

Subject/Index Terms

Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 00091656
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Source Agency: National Technical Information Service
  • Contract Numbers: NSF-GI-33646
  • Files: TRIS
  • Created Date: Aug 13 1975 12:00AM