Ridesharing user equilibrium with nodal matching cost and its implications for congestion tolling and platform pricing

Ridesharing (RS) has been modeled as a specific multimodal equilibrium where solo and RS vehicles have different travel cost structures. An extended network structure that incorporates three types of traffic flows (i.e., solo drivers, RS drivers, and RS riders) has been useful in RS related network design problems and policy making. However, the extended network structure did not model the matching cost between drivers and riders at each node explicitly, leading to unreasonable or undesirable phenomena. For instance, RS drivers may drop off passengers at one node, proceed to the next link, and then pick up passengers again. This frequent pick-up and drop-off phenomenon needs to be fixed before any efficient policies can be proposed. This paper aims to develop a two-layer extended network that allows to model nodal cost whenever a pickup or a drop-off happens. Search friction of drivers and waiting time of riders will be formulated as well. Accordingly, bi-level network design problems are formulated for congestion tolling and platform pricing. For congestion tolling, the authors apply a differential toll scheme and analyze its impact on optimal tolls. For platform pricing, the authors propose two objectives: maximization of social welfare and maximization of the platform revenue, and compare their impact on system performances. Numerical examples are then performed for congestion tolling and platform pricing on the Braess network and the Sioux Falls network, respectively.

Language

  • English

Media Info

Subject/Index Terms

Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 01782102
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Files: TRIS
  • Created Date: Sep 22 2021 11:54AM