Incentive model of a joint delivery alliance considering moral hazard

Considering the increasing pressure of urban logistics and the demands for better service, express enterprises seek to cooperate to establish joint delivery alliances (JDAs) to increase their profits. The purpose of the paper is to design an incentive model to motivate the members to work at their best and to monitor moral hazard. The moral hazard in a team can prevent a JDA from running normally and continuously and keeping the total benefits maximized. Therefore, this paper highlights the effects of the incentive model concerning moral hazard on increasing more collective benefits and develops an incentive mechanism based on incentive compatibility to rationally allocate the profits among members. A punishment mechanism is designed to monitor and prevent the moral hazard for promoting and sustaining cooperation. Finally, a case study based on express enterprises has been conducted to verify the effectiveness of the incentive model.

Language

  • English

Media Info

Subject/Index Terms

Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 01764731
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Files: TRIS
  • Created Date: Dec 30 2020 3:15PM