Quantity-Contingent Auctions and Allocation of Airport Slots

In this paper, the authors define and investigate quantity-contingent auctions. Such auctions can be used when there exist multiple units of a single product and the value of a set of units depends on the total quantity sold. For example, a road network or airport will become congested as the number of users increase so that a permit for use becomes more valuable as the total number allocated decreases. A quantity-contingent auction determines both the number of items sold and an allocation of items to bidders. Because such auctions could be used by bidders to gain excessive market power, the authors impose constraints limiting market power. They focus on auctions that allocate airport arrival and departure slots. They propose a continuous model and an integer programming model for the associated winner determination problem. Using these models, the authors perform computational experiments that lend insights into the properties of the quantity-contingent auction.

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    • Abstracts reprinted with permission of INFORMS (Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, http://www.informs.org).
  • Authors:
    • Ball, Michael O
    • Estes, Alexander S
    • Hansen, Mark
    • Liu, Yulin
  • Publication Date: 2020-7


  • English

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  • Accession Number: 01747594
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Files: TRIS
  • Created Date: Jul 14 2020 4:09PM