Carrier alliance incentive analysis and coordination in a maritime transport chain based on service competition

The authors investigate two competing carriers’ incentives of horizontal alliance and values of vertical cooperation in a one-to-two shipping service competition model, where two carriers may form an alliance. They find that forming alliances reduces carrier service competition, lowers port service price, and weakens port’s monopolistic advantage. Moreover, a combined contract is proposed that coordinates effectively and brings win-win situation for stakeholders, where carrier (alliance) shares profit with port meanwhile port allocates service cost in return. Also, the authors identify the contract has a certain robustness. Furthermore, they improve the contract with compensation mechanism by Nash bargaining for better operation.


  • English

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  • Accession Number: 01712821
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Files: TRIS
  • Created Date: Jul 3 2019 3:04PM