Coordinating a closed-loop supply chain with fairness concerns through variable-weighted Shapley values

This paper considers a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) structure in which a manufacturer allows a retailer and a third-party remanufacturer to sell and remanufacture his products, respectively. Given the retailer’s distributional fairness concerns, the authors investigate the optimal/equilibrium decisions and profits under five non-cooperative and cooperative game models, and focus on how to allocate maximum profit in a centralized setting. Based on the classic Shapley value, the authors propose an innovative weighted allocation approach-namely, the variable-weighted Shapley value-to coordinate this CLSC. Numerical studies demonstrate that when remanufactured products are lowly accepted by consumers, their model outperforms the classic Shapley value.

Language

  • English

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Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 01709565
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Files: TRIS
  • Created Date: May 13 2019 3:05PM