Airline market power and airport regulation

This paper studied the pricing principles and capacity decisions generated at an airport where market power has shifted from the airport to the airlines. Consequently, and in contrast to current research, airlines were given the power to compel the airport to enter into negotiations concerning the prices for aeronautical services. After reviewing the classic monopoly-outcome discussed in OUM ET AL. (2004), their model is altered to suit the new setting. The airport's pricing behaviour concerning the landing fee and the prices for concession services as well as the airport's capacity decision is studied in four different market situations. The airport's pricing principles were found to change according to the market situation.

• Availability:
  • Find a library where document is available. Order URL: http://worldcat.org/issn/00443670
• Authors:
  • Evangelinos, C
  • Szilvay, Z
• Publication Date: 2018-12

Language

• English

Media Info

• Media Type: Print
• Features: References;
• Pagination: pp 171-201
• Serial:
  • Zeitschrift fuer Verkehrswissenschaft
  • Volume: 89
  • Issue Number: 3
  • Publisher: Verkehrs-Verlag J. Fischer
  • ISSN: 0044-3670

Subject/Index Terms

• ITRD Terms: 273: Airline; 1037: Airport; 235: Competition; 224: Cost; 263: Economics of transport; 236: Market; 6473: Mathematical model
• Subject Areas: I10: Economics and Administration;

Filing Info

• Accession Number: 01692283
• Record Type: Publication
• Source Agency: Bundesanstalt für Straßenwesen (BASt)
• Files: ITRD
• Created Date: Feb 6 2019 9:29AM