THE ALLOCATION OF RUNWAY SLOTS BY AUCTION. VOLUME III. THEORY AND TECHNICAL ISSUES FOR IMPLEMENTATION

The allocation of runway slots at the high-density airports by means of an auction is studied. Previous approaches to slot auctions have not allowed for the interdependency of slot values to the air carriers--a single slot for a landing of an aircraft is likely to be of little value without a corresponding slot for a subsequent take-off of that aircraft. A Slot Exchange Auction is designed, its theoretical properties and practical implementation discussed. It is shown to allow the slot market to reach an efficient equilibrium under competitive conditions. The Airline Management Game is used to create a simulation test of the Slot Exchange Auction and its associated continuous market, the slot exchange. (Author)

• Supplemental Notes:
  • See also Volume 2, AD-A085 438. Prepared in cooperation with Flight Transportation Associates.
• Corporate Authors:

  ECON, Incorporated

  900 State Road
  Princeton, NJ  United States  08648

  Federal Aviation Administration

  800 Independence Avenue, SW
  Washington, DC  United States  20591
• Authors:
  • SAND, F M
  • BALINSKI, M L
• Publication Date: 1980-4-15

Media Info

• Pagination: 87 p.

Subject/Index Terms

• TRT Terms: Air transportation; Airport runways; Control systems; Corporations; Cost allocation; Landing; Takeoff
• Old TRIS Terms: Aircraft landing; Allocations; Bargaining
• Subject Areas: Aviation; Pavements;

Filing Info

• Accession Number: 00318156
• Record Type: Publication
• Source Agency: National Technical Information Service
• Report/Paper Numbers: FAA-AVP-80-3-VOL-3
• Contract Numbers: DOT-FA79WA-4374
• Files: NTIS, USDOT
• Created Date: Sep 16 2002 12:00AM