Trading mechanisms for bottleneck permits with multiple purchase opportunities

This paper extends the theory of tradable bottleneck permits system to cases with multiple period markets and designs its implementation mechanism. The multiple period markets can achieve more efficient resource allocation than a single period market when users’ valuations of tradable permits change over time. To implement the multiple period trading markets, the authors propose an evolutionary mechanism that combines a dynamic auction with a capacity control rule that adjusts a number of permits issued for each market. Then, the authors prove that the proposed mechanism has the following desirable properties: (i) the dynamic auction is strategy-proof within each period and guarantees that the market choice of each user is optimal under a perfect information assumption of users and (ii) the mechanism maximizes the social surplus in a finite number of iterations. Finally, the authors show that the proposed mechanism may work well even for an incomplete information case.

Language

  • English

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  • Accession Number: 01679723
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Files: TRIS
  • Created Date: Aug 7 2018 3:03PM