Who canvasses for cargos? Incentive analysis and channel structure in a shipping supply chain

Ocean shipping (OS) and inland shipping (IS) are vertically complementary services in the shipping supply chain. In practice, the authors have observed that both OS and IS companies canvass for cargos. In addition, the authors have observed that more and more IS companies are forming alliances to obtain a better price from the OS companies by hiring a negotiation agent. The authors solve the strategy matrix based on the following questions: “Who canvasses for cargos?” “Should a negotiation agent be hired?” The authors find that when an OS company canvasses for cargos, a negotiation agent can raise the IS service price; however, when IS companies canvass for cargos, a negotiation agent can weaken an OS company's monopolistic advantage. The authors show that there exists a win–win situation when an OS company canvasses for cargos without a negotiation agent and that this win–win situation is Pareto-optimal for all shipping supply chain parties. Interestingly, by comparing the equilibriums under optimal strategies and equilibrium strategies, the authors identify a lose–lose situation. That is, a classic Prisoner's Dilemma occurs when IS companies canvass for cargos and a negotiation agent is hired. The authors find that the shipping supply chain's overall profit and social welfare are maximized when an OS company canvasses for cargos and IS companies do not hire a negotiation agent.

• Record URL:
  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trb.2016.11.007
• Record URL:
  http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191261516302934
• Availability:
  • Find a library where document is available. Order URL: http://worldcat.org/issn/01912615
• Supplemental Notes:
  • Abstract reprinted with permission of Elsevier.
• Authors:
  • Wang, Fan
  • Zhuo, Xiaopo
  • Niu, Baozhuang
  • He, Jiayi
• Publication Date: 2017-3

Language

• English

Media Info

• Media Type: Web
• Features: Appendices; Figures; References; Tables;
• Pagination: pp 78-101
• Serial:
  • Transportation Research Part B: Methodological
  • Volume: 97
  • Publisher: Elsevier
  • ISSN: 0191-2615
  • Serial URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01912615

Subject/Index Terms

• TRT Terms: Cargo handling; Game theory; Ocean shipping; Profits; Supply chain management; Third party logistics providers
• Uncontrolled Terms: Negotiations; Social welfare
• Subject Areas: Administration and Management; Finance; Freight Transportation; Marine Transportation; Operations and Traffic Management; Planning and Forecasting;

Filing Info

• Accession Number: 01633946
• Record Type: Publication
• Files: TRIS
• Created Date: May 1 2017 9:37AM