Optimal Fares and Capacity Decisions for Crowded Public Transport Systems

In this paper we have studied the time profile of ridership on a crowded rail transit line. We solve for the user equilibrium and social optimum when supply is fixed, as well as the long run when service can be optimized. Some of the results parallel those obtained with road traffic congestion models. Passenger loads are distributed more evenly across trains in the social optimum than the user equilibrium. The social optimum can be decentralized by charging higher fares on more popular trains to internalize the crowding cost externality on each train. Imposing differentiated fares makes users worse off --- at least before accounting for how the revenues are used. Other results are less obvious. The welfare gains from tolling are independent of total ridership. Expanding the number of trains can also be more valuable in the social optimum than the user equilibrium even though total system costs are lower in the social optimum.

Language

  • English

Media Info

  • Media Type: Web
  • Pagination: 1 PDF file, 330 KB, 15p.
  • Monograph Title: Canadian Transportation Research Forum 50th Annual Conference - Another 50 Years: Where to From Here?//Un autre 50 ans : qu'en est-il à partir de maintenant? Montreal, Quebec, May 24-26, 2015

Subject/Index Terms

Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 01605029
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Source Agency: Transportation Association of Canada (TAC)
  • Files: ITRD, TAC
  • Created Date: Jul 26 2016 5:04PM