The wage subsidy index determines an important portion of the operation differential subsidy. This system is based on a wage index for the national economy. If increases, with respect to some base period, in the cost of collective bargaining exceed the increase in the index, the operator will receive no subsidy payments on this excess. Conversely, should changes in collective bargaining costs be less than changes in the index, the operator can pocket the difference between the wage index and the costs he incurs. The wage subsidy index system, while possessing many advantages, such as freeing labour settlements from government interference and rendering the costs of operating a U.S. vessel more competitive on world routes, might prove disadvantageous to maritime labour. This is because it will effectively tie wage changes of seafarers to overall productivity changes of the economy, and it is expected that in the coming decade output per man in the maritime industry will rise faster than in the economy at large. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the forces that led to the creation of this wage index. The paper also discusses the computation and the implementation of the index, and studies its impact on future wage trends of seafarers.

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  • Corporate Authors:

    London School of Economics and Political Science

    Houghton Street, Aldwych
    London WC2A 2AE,   England 
  • Authors:
    • Franco, G R
  • Publication Date: 1973-9

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Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 00050316
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Files: TRIS
  • Created Date: Nov 14 1973 12:00AM