Optimal Pricing Model for Monopoly Third Party Logistics Enterprises under Information Asymmetry

In actual economic life, information required is asymmetric between the third party logistics enterprises and demanders. It is difficult for the third party logistic enterprises to understand willingness-to-pay of each potential demander. To avoid arbitrary pricing for logistics services, the third party logistics enterprises can use information-discriminating principle and mechanism design principle to design an optimal consumption combination sequence, so as to demonstrate the actual demand pattern of logistics demanders, maximizing customer utility and profits of logistics enterprises. This paper discusses about determination of nonlinear optimal pricing in monopoly market where logistics demanders having high-demand or low-demand exist, so as to give references to pricing standard for logistics enterprises.

Language

  • English

Media Info

  • Media Type: Web
  • Features: Figures; References; Tables;
  • Pagination: pp 3100-3105
  • Monograph Title: International Conference on Transportation Engineering 2009

Subject/Index Terms

Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 01534576
  • Record Type: Publication
  • ISBN: 9780784410394
  • Files: TRIS, ASCE
  • Created Date: Nov 12 2013 1:43PM