A Hybrid Implementation Mechanism of Tradable Network Permits System Which Obviates Path Enumeration: An Auction Mechanism with Day-to-day Capacity Control

Akamatsu, Sato, and Nguyen (2006) and Akamatsu (2007a,b) proposed a new dynamic traffic congestion control scheme—the tradable network permit—and proved its efficiency properties for general road networks. To implement tradable permit markets successfully, this paper proposes a novel auction mechanism with capacity control. Assuming that each user makes a trip from an origin to a destination along a path in a specific time period, the authors design an auction mechanism that enables each user to purchase a bundle of network permits corresponding to a set of links in the user's preferred path. The proposed mechanism employs an evolutionary approach to achieve a dynamic system optimal allocation of network permits in a computationally efficient manner. Specifically, it is a hybrid mechanism that consistently combines an auction mechanism with a path capacity control, which are repeated on a day-to-day basis. The former phase involves selling bundles of permits, and the latter phase involves adjusting of the number of the bundles, which corresponds to the path capacities. The authors prove that the proposed mechanism has the following desirable properties: (i) truthful bidding is the dominant strategy for each user on each day; and (ii) the permit allocation pattern under the mechanism converges to an approximate dynamic system optimal allocation pattern in the sense that the achieved social surplus reaches its maximum value when the number of users is large. Furthermore, they show that the proposed mechanism can be extended to obviate path enumeration by introducing a column generation procedure.


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  • Accession Number: 01491547
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Files: TRIS
  • Created Date: Aug 14 2013 1:17PM