Container Transshipment and Port Competition

The purpose of this paper is to study container port competition for transshipment cargo in a duopoly market. The authors develop the linear container handling demand function which incorporates transshipment traffic and applies a non-cooperative two-stage game to a vertical-structure seaport market with ports as upstream players and shipping lines as downstream players. The authors explain the drivers behind port competition through the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium which incorporates the shipping lines' port call decision and the ports' pricing decision. The authors also analyze a port collusion model and a social optimum model, and compare it with the non-cooperative model for further insights. Numerical simulations are conducted to demonstrate the results.


  • English

Media Info

  • Media Type: Digital/other
  • Features: Appendices; Figures; References;
  • Pagination: pp 461-478
  • Monograph Title: Proceedings of the International Forum on Shipping, Ports and Airports (IFSPA) 2012: Transport Logistics for Sustainable Growth at a New Level

Subject/Index Terms

Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 01485316
  • Record Type: Publication
  • ISBN: 9789623677578
  • Files: TRIS
  • Created Date: Jun 27 2013 5:45PM