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    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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      <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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      <link>https://trid.trb.org/</link>
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    <item>
      <title>Golden Tester Framework for SAE J1939-91C Cybersecurity</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2784466</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The impending formal adoption of SAE J1939-91C creates an urgent need for rigorous, repeatable validation methods that extend beyond functional conformance. This paper presents a structured validation and benchmarking framework, with a focus on performance characterization across dynamic vehicle configurations. Building on prior work in secure network formation, rekeying, and Golden Tester concepts, we define a minimal, transport-agnostic set of cryptographic and protocol test vectors for deterministic validation of secure message authentication, alongside simulation-based methods for evaluating network formation and rekey behavior. The framework integrates performance metrics such as secure message latency, rekey time and throughput, while also introducing cybersecurity-specific diagnostics and logging requirements for gateway module implementation. Security validation scenarios are mapped to explicit detection and response benchmarks. The resulting methodology provides OEMs, Tier-1 suppliers, and research organizations with a practical, reproducible approach to validating J1939-91C implementations, supporting both development-phase evaluation and ongoing lifecycle assurance.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 10:57:33 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2784466</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>TruckSentry: Context Aware Intrusion Detection and Prevention System for J1939 Networks</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2553688</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Medium and heavy-duty vehicles often have third party devices connected to their in-vehicle networks, which raises security concerns. A gateway or firewall is used as an architectural element in the vehicle network to help mitigate threats from direct access to these external connections. However, the logic used in these gateways is often unknown. As such, this paper describes and demonstrates the logic of TruckSentry, a next-generation stateful firewall for in-vehicle SAE-J1939 networks within medium and heavy-duty vehicles. TruckSentry consumes conditional rules, enforces them in a stateful manner, and can be configured to pre-empt seemingly threatening messages from being processed by the target device. By utilizing radix search trees on the bits transmitted on the Controller Area Network, the approach can apply rules during transmission. If a malicious message is detected, the system can induce bit flips in the message stream and prevent the message from reaching the application layer. Experiments with correctly configured rules show TruckSentry can identify known threats to SAE-J1939 networks while being attached to a broadcast in-vehicle network and support hundreds of rules at wire speed, even when deployed on commodity in-vehicle development hardware. TruckSentry also demonstrates the use case of next generation firewalls on serial embedded networks, especially where contextual information can be obtained and used to evaluate threatening messages.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 28 Aug 2025 17:11:55 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2553688</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CANASTA: Controller Area Network Authentication Schedulability Timing Analysis</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2250718</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The Controller Area Network (CAN) dominates in-vehicle networking systems in modern vehicles. CAN was designed with low-latency and reliability as key features. Authenticity of a CAN frame was not considered in the design, thus, most in-vehicle network nodes inherently trust received messages as coming from a legitimate source. As a result, it is trivial to program (or hack) a network node to spoof traffic. Authentication is challenging for CAN and related protocols, such as SAE J1939, due to limited frame sizes and high bus utilization. Adding a message authentication code (MAC) as a separate message can unduly stress the real-time delivery of safety-critical messages. Although this stressor is well-known, the impact of authentication protocols on real-time message delivery in CAN has not yet been thoroughly examined. In this paper, the authors provide the first comprehensive analysis of real-time schedulability analysis applied to authentication schemes for CAN, CAN Flexible Data-rate (CAN FD), and CAN extra long payload (CAN XL). The authors formulate the response time analysis for addition of MACs and periodic transmission of MACs, and the authors examine their impact on two case studies and through evaluation with randomized schedulability experiments over a wide range of message sets.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 25 Sep 2023 16:26:33 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2250718</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Robust Certificateless Authentication Protocol for the SAE J1939 Commercial Vehicles Bus</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2156241</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Authentication for controller area network (CAN) buses in an intra-vehicular network involving electronic control units (ECUs) is a challenging factor. The Society of Automotive Engineers standard (SAE J1939) incorporating the ISO 11898-1 specification for the data link and physical layers of the standard CAN and CAN-flexible data rate (CAN-FD) handles communication among ECUs. The SAE J1939 is vulnerable to replay, masquerading and machine-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. To prevent such attacks, there exist protocol suites for resource-constrained and resource-unconstrained nodes proposed in the literature which are not formally analysed. The authors formally analyse one of the comprehensive protocol suites using the state-of-the-art Tamarin automated validation tool. To mitigate the identified attacks, the authors propose two new authentication protocols. At first, the authors propose one pass authentication protocol for computationally restricted nodes. For nodes that are not restricted computationally, the authors present a certificateless signature-based authentication protocol. Additionally, the authors present a new certificateless key insulated manageable signature (CL-KIMS) scheme for signature-based authentication protocol. CL-KIMS ensures key insulation and random access key update properties, and assures self-healing property. The security of the proposed protocol suite and signature scheme is formally analysed using the random oracle model (ROM). Especially, CL-KIMS scheme is provably secure in the ROM against Type-I and Type-II adversaries. A detailed performance comparison and simulation study show that the proposed protocol suite has lesser communication overhead and ensures robust security as compared to the existing protocol suites.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 23 May 2023 10:09:12 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2156241</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OBD Communication Concepts for J1939 Systems</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1806583</link>
      <description><![CDATA[As regulations for on-board diagnostics head toward the heavy-duty trucking industry, there are a variety of new communication concepts that will directly impact J1939 systems. ECUs on J1939 networks must support new standard diagnostic protocols and data. Vehicles must provide single-point access for concise OBD data sets that represent multiple ECUs. New technologies, such as wireless communication links, present completely new and different scenarios for diagnostic testing. Understanding these concepts and their implications is essential to designing a J1939 system that will integrate into the coming global OBD infrastructure.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 15 Dec 2022 14:15:19 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1806583</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Real-Time Network Defense of SAE J1939 Address Claim Attacks</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1882365</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Heavy vehicles are essential for the modern economy, delivering critical food, supplies, and freight throughout the world. Connected heavy vehicles are also driven by embedded computers that utilize internal communication using common standards. However, some implementations of the standards leave an opening for a malicious actor to abuse the system. One such abuse case is a cyber-attack known as the “Address Claim Attack.” Proposed in 2018, this attack uses a single network message to disable all communication to and from a target electronic control unit, which may have a detrimental effect on operating the vehicle. This article demonstrates the viability of the attack and then describes the implementation of a solution to prevent this attack in real time without requiring any intervention from the manufacturer of the target devices. The defense technique uses a bit-banged Controller Area Network (CAN) filter to detect the attack. Once an attack is discovered, the defender induces a CAN protocol error to remove the malicious message from the network. We discuss our results in terms of their applicability for Address Claim Attacks and possible implications for preventing a variety of network-based attacks in real time.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 13 Jan 2022 13:52:58 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1882365</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Asynchronous Sensor Fusion of GPS, IMU and CAN-Based Odometry for Heavy-Duty Vehicles</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1879879</link>
      <description><![CDATA[In heavy-duty vehicles, multiple signals are available to estimate the vehicle's kinematics, such as Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), Global Positioning System (GPS) and linear and angular speed readings from wheel tachometers on the internal Controller Area Network (CAN). These signals have different noise variance, bandwidth and sampling rate (being the latter, possibly, irregular). In this paper we present a non-linear sensor fusion algorithm allowing asynchronous sampling and non-causal smoothing. It is applied to achieve accuracy improvements when incorporating odometry measurements from CAN bus to standard GPS+IMU kinematic estimation, as well as the robustness against missing data. Our results show that this asynchronous multi-sensor (GPS+IMU+CAN-based odometry) fusion is advantageous in low-speed manoeuvres, improving accuracy and robustness to missing data, thanks to non-causal filtering. The proposed algorithm is based on Extended Kalman Filter and Smoother, with exponential discretization of continuous-time stochastic differential equations, in order to process measurements at arbitrary time instants; it can provide data to subsequent processing steps at arbitrary time instants, not necessarily coincident with the original measurement ones. Given the extra information available in the smoothing case, its estimation performance is less sensitive to the noise-variance parameter setting, compared to causal filtering. Working Matlab code is provided at the end of this work.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 30 Sep 2021 09:30:30 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1879879</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Drive Force and Longitudinal Dynamics Estimation in Heavy-Duty Vehicles</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1647620</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Modelling the dynamic behaviour of heavy vehicles, such as buses or trucks, can be very useful for driving simulation and training, autonomous driving, crash analysis, etc. However, dynamic modelling of a vehicle is a difficult task because there are many subsystems and signals that affect its behaviour. In addition, it might be hard to combine data because available signals come at different rates, or even some samples might be missed due to disturbances or communication issues. In this paper, the authors propose a non-invasive data acquisition hardware/software setup to carry out several experiments with an urban bus, in order to collect data from one of the internal communication networks and other embedded systems. Subsequently, non-conventional sampling data fusion using a Kalman filter has been implemented to fuse data gathered from different sources, connected through a wireless network (the vehicle’s internal CAN bus messages, IMU, GPS, and other sensors placed in pedals). The authors results show that the proposed combination of experimental data gathering and multi-rate filtering algorithm allows useful signal estimation for vehicle identification and modelling, even when data samples are missing.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 29 Oct 2019 09:32:18 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1647620</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Security Shortcomings and Countermeasures for the SAE J1939 Commercial Vehicle Bus Protocol</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1512918</link>
      <description><![CDATA[In the recent years, countless security concerns related to automotive systems were revealed either by academic research or real life attacks. While current attention was largely focused on passenger cars, due to their ubiquity, the reported bus-related vulnerabilities are applicable to all industry sectors where the same bus technology is deployed, i.e., the CAN bus. The SAE J1939 specification extends and standardizes the use of CAN to commercial vehicles where security plays an even higher role. In contrast to empirical results that attest such vulnerabilities in commercial vehicles by practical experiments, here, the authors determine that existing shortcomings in the SAE J1939 specifications open road to several new attacks, e.g., impersonation, denial of service (DoS), distributed DoS, etc. Taking the advantage of an industry-standard CANoe based simulation, the authors demonstrate attacks with potential safety critical effects that are mounted while still conforming to the SAE J1939 standard specification. The authors discuss countermeasures and security enhancements by including message authentication mechanisms. Finally, the authors evaluate and discuss the impact of employing these mechanisms on the overall network communication.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 28 Jun 2018 13:56:28 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1512918</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Securing J1939 Communications Using Strong Encryption with FIPS 140-2</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1461829</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Since 2001, all sensitive information of U.S. Federal Agencies has been protected by strong encryption mandated by the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-2 Security Requirements. The requirements specify a formal certification process. The process ensures that validated encryption modules have implemented the standard, and have passed a rigorous testing and review processes. Today, this same strong security protection has become possible for vehicle networks using modern, cost-effective encryption in hardware.         This paper introduces the motivation and context for the encryption diagnostics security in terms of all vehicles in general, not just trucks which use SAE J1939 communications. Several practical scenarios for using such encryption hardware and the advantages of using hardware compared to software private-key encryption and public-key encryption are described.         This paper describes strong FIPS 140-2 encryption for vehicle diagnostics communications, using as an example the J1939 protocol. The encrypted J1939 data and commands are tamper-proof, since they cannot be changed or altered -- accidentally or otherwise. The encrypted J1939 data and commands can also be stored and transported securely, giving no unauthorized read access.         The examples will show J1939 encryption, communicating over both wired and wireless networks. Two-factor authentication is achieved, since both the hardware and a password key are needed to decrypt. And, the same hardware can provide both private-key encryption (traditional symmetric encryption) and public-key encryption (asymmetric encryption and digital signatures).         The conclusion states results of successfully tested FIPS 140-2 cryptographic hardware implementation for embedded systems communication of J1939 diagnostic commands over wireless networks using both ZigBee and Wi-Fi.       ]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 May 2018 18:18:39 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1461829</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Merge Ahead: Integrating Heavy Duty Vehicle Networks with Wide Area Network Services</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1431411</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Commercial vehicle operators have many options available to them for managing their assets. Whether in an on-highway fleet, agricultural / off-road, construction, or military, available real-time vehicle information is growing. While accessing this data via applicable Wide Area Networks (WANs) is commonplace, new technologies are just beginning to develop to take advantage of all of the connectivity possibilities to further aid in delivery of goods and services. As an enabler to expanding these fleet management applications, vehicle on-board networks (commonly referred to as “in-vehicle” or simply “vehicle networks”) are expected to support a growing number of vehicle related technological solutions.         This paper provides background on vehicle networks, including key terminology, an introduction to standards based protocols, and critical SAE vehicle network related standards. While an historical view of vehicle network topologies and a rationale for the very first vehicle networks is summarized, growth applications such as fleet management system use of vehicle network data generated is emphasized.                To provide an understanding of the importance of a vehicle network backbone, a comparison to modern local area networks (LANs) is provided, along with the structure of the data packets or Protocol Data Units (PDUs). Next, standards based vehicle networks supporting Heavy Duty vehicles are described to explain information is conveyed. These standard protocols include SAE       J1708       ,       J1587       ,       J1939       ,       J2534       , CAN (ISO 11898), and ATA/TMC RP1210. In order to illustrate how these standard protocols work, this paper provides a detailed overview of SAE       J1939       including the       J1939       -7 and       J1939       -73 standards, as well as Heavy-Duty On Board Diagnostics (HD OB) standard Messaging and Diagnostics that use       J1939       . The paper describes how these protocols and those related with LAN and WAN networks complement each other to provide end-to-end connectivity to support a variety of fleet management applications.             Next, the promise of leveraging integration of vehicle networks with LANs and Wide Area Networks (WANs) is discussed. While the industry has recently begun the implementation of the aforementioned internetworking, future inter-vehicle networking scenarios will be described, along with proposed standards required for implementation.         Finally, the future for vehicle networking is outlined including opportunities for standards development in the area of security, bandwidth allocation, application-specific vehicle network protocols, and emerging WANs.       ]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 15 Sep 2017 10:39:09 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1431411</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Development of Interface Specifications for Mobile Data Platforms on DOT Vehicles</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/976095</link>
      <description><![CDATA[AVL/GPS/Sensor Data Collection Systems are typically deployed within transportation maintenance fleets. All too often, highway maintenance engineers invest resources into automatic vehicle location (AVL) and global positioning systems (GPS) along with several types of sensors, only to find that the systems are proprietary and that it is difficult to incorporate new technology. Developing a set of standards to develop interoperable components becomes essential. This Clear Roads project developed a set of generic specifications and proposes an implementation plan to standardize them at the national level. The specification designates a standard modem/GPS unit that employs cellular and Wi-Fi communications to transmit to a web based server. In-vehicle, the modem/GPS unit connects to the engine bus of each transportation vehicle using the SAE J1939 interface. All onboard sensors are connected to the engine bus and the modem/GPS unit listens for sensor data. It is remotely programmed to collect and transmit the desired information for each unique user community to a transportation database. The implementation plan is built upon petitioning a standard granting organization such as SAE or IEEE through the use of a national sponsor such as APWA or FHWA with the Clear Roads proposed specification. By adopting a standard interface, vendors can remain competitive, offer unique services, yet provide a wide range of interoperable products for the transportation industry.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 22 Oct 2010 11:35:27 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/976095</guid>
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