Road Pricing and Bus Service Policies

This paper develops a model that takes into account the way in which buses and automobiles interact in terms of adding to or reducing congestion. The work is carried out for situations in which buses and automobiles share the same road network, but it is one in which automobiles are underpriced. The motivation is to better understand policy responses to underpriced automobiles in order to reduce their use and reduce congestion. The congestion interaction between buses and automobiles is described as a situation where the use of the automobile (or bus) affects the cost of the bus (or automobile) because of congestion costs imposed on the road network. This paper’s model uses three alternatives for bus service: 1) the second-best bus provision; 2) private monopolistic bus provision; and, 3) bus provision under zero profits. It shows that bus providers set their own rules for frequency due to congestion interaction between the modes. It also investigates how different types of bus operation respond to a road toll that is not optimal. The author concludes that when automobile use is under-priced, a bus’s congestion externality to auto users is taken into account to a lesser degree in all types of bus service. Different road pricing affects providers differently, depending on their unique choices. Under more congested conditions, private welfare experiences greater improvements, and these increase with public bus provision.

Language

  • English

Media Info

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Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 01122782
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Source Agency: UC Berkeley Transportation Library
  • Files: BTRIS, TRIS, ATRI
  • Created Date: Feb 27 2009 7:55AM