Analysis of a revenue-sharing contract in supply chain management

The authors consider a supply chain involving one supplier and one retailer in which a revenue-sharing contract is adopted. Under this contract, the retailer can obtain the product from the supplier at a discounted price. As a compensation, the retailer must share his revenue with the supplier at a certain revenue-sharing rate, say r (0 ≤ r ≤1), where r represents the portion of the revenue to be kept by the retailer. The authors' ultimate objective is to help the whole supply chain be more profitable while upholding the individual components' incentives. The authors use a two-stage (Stackelberg) game to model the problem, where one player is the game's leader and the other the game's follower. Analysis reveals that for the supply chain to be more profitable, the party that keeps more than half the revenue should serve as the leader of the Stackelberg game.

• Record URL:
  • http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/13675560701380354
• Availability:
  • Find a library where document is available. Order URL: http://worldcat.org/issn/13675567
• Supplemental Notes:
  • Abstract reprinted with permission from Taylor & Francis
• Authors:
  • Qin, Z
  • Yang, J
• Publication Date: 2008

Language

• English

Media Info

• Media Type: Print
• Features: Figures; References; Tables;
• Pagination: pp 17-29
• Serial:
  • International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications
  • Volume: 11
  • Issue Number: 1
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis
  • ISSN: 1367-5567
  • EISSN: 1469-848X
  • Serial URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/cjol20/current

Subject/Index Terms

• TRT Terms: Contracts; Incentives; Mathematical models; Profits; Suppliers; Supply chain management
• Identifier Terms: Stackelberg game
• Uncontrolled Terms: Revenue sharing; Vendors
• Subject Areas: Administration and Management; Finance; Freight Transportation; Highways; Planning and Forecasting; I10: Economics and Administration; I72: Traffic and Transport Planning;

Filing Info

• Accession Number: 01089615
• Record Type: Publication
• Files: TRIS
• Created Date: Mar 3 2008 8:59AM