Fixing the Blame: Organizational Culture and the Quebec Bridge Collapse

In August 1907, the Quebec Bridge, celebrated as a great engineering marvel as it neared completion, suddenly collapsed, killing 75 workers and injuring 11 others. The conventional view of why the bridge collapsed is based primarily on the conclusions of the Canadian Royal Commission established to investigate the causes of the collapse; the report of the Royal Commission blamed two engineers and their errors in judgment. This article argues that organizational failures contributed directly to the three key technical errors the Royal Commission deemed responsible for the bridge's collapse: flawed design of the main compression chords, underestimation of the bridge's weight, and the decision to allow unprecedented stress limits. The author notes that the erroneous weight estimate was not an accidental oversight by the two engineers (Szlapka and Cooper) but a direct consequence of the contracting company's work-flow policy, which neither engineer had authority to change. More broadly, organizational analysis shows that the Quebec Bridge project exemplified the rise of a mass-production system in North American bridge building, which proved ill-suited to large-scale, innovative undertakings. The author also considers an enduring question concerning individual responsibility within large organizations; this is of heightened interest in engineering because of the risk to life that so often accompanies errors in this field. The author stresses that responsibility and blame appear different when the intricate links between technical and organizational choices are revealed. This approach focuses attention not only on the variable parameters of blame but also on the politics of fixing blame. The author concludes that accountable engineering in a bureaucratized world depends on recognizing that organizational environments influence technical judgments.

• Authors:
  • Kranakis, Edna
• Publication Date: 2004-7

Language

• English

Media Info

• Media Type: Print
• Features: Figures; References;
• Pagination: pp 487-518
• Serial:
  • Technology and Culture
  • Volume: 45
  • Issue Number: 3
  • Publisher: University of Chicago Press

Subject/Index Terms

• TRT Terms: Bridge engineering; Bridge substructures; Bridge superstructures; Collapse; Collapse strength; Compression; Crash causes; Deformation curve; Design; Legal responsibility; Weight
• Identifier Terms: Quebec Bridge; Quebec Bridge collapse, 1907
• Uncontrolled Terms: Fault (Blame); Mass production; Organizational climate; Organizational structure
• Subject Areas: Design; History; Railroads; Safety and Human Factors;

Filing Info

• Accession Number: 01079840
• Record Type: Publication
• Files: TRIS
• Created Date: Oct 25 2007 10:24AM