Maintenance, Service Quality and Congestion Pricing with Competing Roads
This paper studies maintenance and tolling decisions by two competing private operators of roads that experience depreciation and congestion. Duopoly generally results in higher social costs not only in the first-best optimum, but also the second-best optimum in which roads can be maintained but not tolled. Duopoly, as a rule, performs best when roads have equal capacities and intrinsic qualities so that market power is balanced. It also performs better when maintenance and tolling decisions are made simultaneously rather than sequentially because firms in the sequential game curtail maintenance in the first stage in order to soften toll competition in the second stage.
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Availability:
- Find a library where document is available. Order URL: http://worldcat.org/issn/01912615
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Supplemental Notes:
- Abstract reprinted with permission from Elsevier
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Authors:
- de Palma, Andre
- Kilani, Moez
- Lindsey, Robin
- Publication Date: 2007-6
Language
- English
Media Info
- Media Type: Print
- Features: Appendices; References; Tables;
- Pagination: pp 573-591
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Serial:
- Transportation Research Part B: Methodological
- Volume: 41
- Issue Number: 5
- Publisher: Elsevier
- ISSN: 0191-2615
- Serial URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01912615
Subject/Index Terms
- TRT Terms: Competition; Congestion pricing; Costs; Decision making; Depreciation; Maintenance; Market dominance; Mathematical models; Private enterprise; Private roads; Quality of service; Roads; Sequential analysis; Social factors; Toll roads; Tolls; Traffic congestion
- Uncontrolled Terms: Duopoly; Efficiency; Optimum
- Subject Areas: Administration and Management; Data and Information Technology; Finance; Highways; Maintenance and Preservation; Society; I10: Economics and Administration;
Filing Info
- Accession Number: 01045439
- Record Type: Publication
- Files: TRIS, ATRI
- Created Date: Apr 2 2007 7:02AM