Determining the Desired Amount of Parking Using Game Theory

The problem of seeking an optimal parking policy is formulated here as a Stackelberg game between the government and the travelers. The government wishes to encourage transit ridership while keeping a strong urban center; unlike most existing tools that assist in determining parking policies, the proposed game includes an explicit quantitative formulation of the governmental objective. Each traveler wishes to gain a maximum utility from his choice of destination and transportation mode, and the choice distribution of all travelers is obtained by logit model. A fundamental difference exists between game theory practice and common assumptions used in transportation modeling regarding the relationship between a single traveler's utility and the choice distribution of all travelers. This difference is tackled here through the definition of the player that represents the travelers and its objective function. A simple version of the game is tested in 24 imaginary scenarios of transportation and urban conditions.

• Availability:
  • Find a library where document is available. Order URL: http://worldcat.org/issn/07339488
• Authors:
  • Hollander, Yaron
  • Prashker, Joseph N
  • Mahalel, David
• Publication Date: 2006-3

Language

• English

Media Info

• Media Type: Print
• Features: Figures; References; Tables;
• Pagination: pp 53-61
• Serial:
  • Journal of Urban Planning and Development
  • Volume: 132
  • Issue Number: 1
  • Publisher: American Society of Civil Engineers
  • ISSN: 0733-9488
  • EISSN: 1943-5444
  • Serial URL: http://ascelibrary.org/journal/jupddm

Subject/Index Terms

• TRT Terms: Game theory; Logits; Mathematical models; Mode choice; Optimization; Parking; Parking demand
• Subject Areas: Highways; Planning and Forecasting; Public Transportation; I72: Traffic and Transport Planning;

Filing Info

• Accession Number: 01023402
• Record Type: Publication
• Files: TRIS, ATRI
• Created Date: Apr 28 2006 8:10AM