WAGE PAYOFFS AND DISTANCE DETERRENCE IN THE JOURNEY TO WORK

This paper discusses some theoretical aspects of distance-deterrence functions in modeling commuting to work. A microeconomic model is proposed for how commuting flows relate to traveling distance in a two-region system. Commuting is the preferred choice of a worker whenever he can obtain an increase in wages greater than the cost of commuting. The proposed framework is based on an approach where workers apply for jobs according to a strategy that maximizes their expected payoffs (wages minus commuting costs). It is assumed that individual workers are qualified for only one job category. The authors demonstrate that commuting flows in such situations result not only from wage differentials and distances but also from a spatial mismatch between the types of jobs and the categories of workers. The authors discuss the possibility of a systematic bias when actual traveling distances are represented by distances between city centers, ignoring intrazonal distances. It is demonstrated that the distance-deterrence function is globally concave when observed on a scale that is not too small.

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  • English

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  • Accession Number: 00977948
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Files: TRIS, ATRI
  • Created Date: Aug 21 2004 12:00AM