EFFECTS OF THE OPTIMAL STEP TOLL SCHEME ON EQUILIBRIUM COMMUTER BEHAVIOUR

In this study, commuters' equilibrium queuing costs and equilibrium schedule delay costs are derived before and after levying optimal step tolls at a queuing bottleneck. By dealing with these equilibrium costs, some changes in equilibrium commuter behavior can be forecasted from the no-toll to the Optimal step toll case. Several useful observations can be made from this research. The number of commuters who will or will not pay the tolls can be investigated before tolling a queuing bottleneck. All commuters' departure time switching decisions from the no-toll to the tolled cases can also be investigated before tolling. Lastly, the increased leisure time in the morning to the toll payer due to departing from home later than his or her original departure time in the no-toll case can be investigated before tolling. These findings on equilibrium commuter behavior can be useful to policymakers considering an optimal step toll scheme.

  • Availability:
  • Corporate Authors:

    Chapman and Hall, Limited

    2-6 Boundary Row
    London, SE1 8HN,   England 
  • Authors:
    • Laih, C-H
  • Publication Date: 2004-1

Language

  • English

Media Info

  • Pagination: p. 59-81
  • Serial:
    • Applied Economics
    • Volume: 36
    • Issue Number: 1
    • Publisher: Chapman and Hall, Limited
    • ISSN: 0003-6846

Subject/Index Terms

Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 00974089
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Files: TRIS
  • Created Date: May 4 2004 12:00AM