MORAL HAZARD IN TRAFFIC GAMES

Despite safer vehicles and increased investment in road safety, accident rates have not fallen. The reason, say experts, is that road users are less careful because they factor road and vehicle safety into their driving behavior. The response of drivers on external safety improvements is known as "moral hazard" effects. In this paper, the author attempts to explain traffic safety behavior among road users through a two-person game-theoretical model, in which they identify road users as '"hawks" and "doves." It was found that when two aggressive road users, hawks, meet in traffic, unsafe actions are taken that imply high accident risk for both. Improvements in safety conditions increases high risk situations on the roads.

• Availability:
  • Find a library where document is available. Order URL: http://worldcat.org/oclc/856156
• Corporate Authors:

  University of Bath

  Claverton Down
  Bath, Avon  United Kingdom  BA2 7AY
• Authors:
  • Pedersen, P A
• Publication Date: 2003-1

Language

• English

Media Info

• Features: References;
• Pagination: p. 47-68
• Serial:
  • Journal of Transport Economics and Policy
  • Volume: 37
  • Issue Number: 1
  • Publisher: University of Bath
  • ISSN: 0022-5258
  • Serial URL: http://www.jtep.com

Subject/Index Terms

• TRT Terms: Aggression; Behavior; Drivers; Game theory; Mathematical models
• Subject Areas: Highways; Safety and Human Factors;

Filing Info

• Accession Number: 00942657
• Record Type: Publication
• Source Agency: UC Berkeley Transportation Library
• Files: BTRIS, TRIS, ATRI
• Created Date: Jun 2 2003 12:00AM