ENTRY, EXCLUSION, AND EXPULSION IN A SINGLE HUB AIRPORT SYSTEM

Airport congestion is best handled by peak period pricing. The most efficient means of implementing such a scheme is via some type of slot auction mechanism. This paper addresses the questions of what happens to slot prices when the nummber of competitors increases, as well as whether or not a financially strong firm can use the auctions to overpower its weaker rivals. Slot prices rise with the number of air carriers competing in the market. The paper also demonstrates that it is not feasible for financially strong carriers to attempt to use the auction process to either exclude potential rivals or to expel them from the market.

Media Info

  • Features: Figures; References; Tables;
  • Pagination: p. 27-36
  • Monograph Title: Modeling and Analysis of Airport and Aircraft Operations
  • Serial:

Subject/Index Terms

Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 00494440
  • Record Type: Publication
  • ISBN: 0309048176
  • Files: TRIS, TRB
  • Created Date: May 31 1990 12:00AM