GNSS Interference: Situational Awareness and LEO Backup

This research has addressed the major goals of the Center for Automated Vehicle Research with Multimodal AssurEd Navigation (CARMEN+) University Transportation Center (UTC), mainly in (1) identifying and analyzing existing and emerging cybersecurity threats to highly HATS, and (2) developing and experimentally verifying cyber-resilient mitigation methods. Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) is fragile: its service is easily denied by jammers or deceived by spoofers. The civilian aviation and maritime industries are seeing significant electronic warfare spillover from nearby conflict zones. A technique was developed and experimentally verified to geolocate GNSS spoofers with a single-satellite from Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Additionally, the authors have been studying the possibility of using signals from mega constellations of LEO satellites designed for broadband communications as a backup to traditional GNSS for position, navigation, and timing (PNT). The findings are presented in this report. Commercial partnerships with existing LEO constellations can be fruitful, as they can provide near real-time GNSS interference monitoring and can serve as backup PNT services when GNSS is denied.

Language

  • English

Media Info

  • Media Type: Digital/other
  • Edition: Final Report
  • Features: Figures; Photos; References;
  • Pagination: 45p

Subject/Index Terms

Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 01934712
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Contract Numbers: 69A3552348327
  • Files: UTC, NTL, TRIS, USDOT
  • Created Date: Oct 22 2024 3:48PM