Booking versus search-based parking strategy: A game-theoretic methodology

With the proliferation of digital platforms, the parking landscape has undergone a transformation, offering more than the traditional first-come-first-served parking option. The reservation-based parking mode has gained considerable popularity. Obviously, there is a competitive relationship between these two parking modes, posing a challenge for parking management authorities to achieve a balance. This study investigates pricing strategies in a duopoly parking market, comprising two distinct types of parking companies: search-based and reservation-based. The authors analyze three power structure models: (i) the Bertrand model, (ii) the Stackelberg model with the reservation-based parking company as a leader, and (iii) the Stackelberg model with the search-based parking company as a leader. Additionally, the authors develop a three-player game model that considers the involvement of the third-party investor in the reservation mode. The authors' findings indicate that the overall profit of the search-based parking company declines when the driver preference of reservation-based parking company increases. Moreover, reservation-based parking companies exhibit greater robustness compared to their search-based counterparts when facing penalty delays and fluctuations in waiting costs. Furthermore, a prudent evaluation is advised for the third-party investor when assessing investment opportunities, especially in scenarios where drivers demonstrate a pronounced preference for search-based parking companies.

• Record URL:
  • https://doi.org/10.1016/j.retrec.2024.101416
• Record URL:
  • http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0739885924000118
• Availability:
  • Find a library where document is available. Order URL: http://worldcat.org/issn/07398859
• Supplemental Notes:
  • © 2024 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Abstract reprinted with permission of Elsevier.
• Authors:
  • Tan, Bing Qing
  • 0000-0002-3534-0529
  • Xu, Su Xiu
  • Thürer, Matthias
  • Kang, Kai
  • 0000-0002-3142-5883
  • Zhao, Zhiheng
  • 0000-0002-0024-8116
  • Li, Ming
• Publication Date: 2024-5

Language

• English

Media Info

• Media Type: Web
• Features: References;
• Pagination: 101416
• Serial:
  • Research in Transportation Economics
  • Volume: 104
  • Issue Number: 0
  • Publisher: Elsevier
  • ISSN: 0739-8859
  • Serial URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/07398859

Subject/Index Terms

• TRT Terms: Competition; Consumer preferences; Game theory; Parking; Pricing; Reservations
• Subject Areas: Highways; Operations and Traffic Management;

Filing Info

• Accession Number: 01912812
• Record Type: Publication
• Files: TRIS
• Created Date: Mar 22 2024 9:20AM